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This paper discusses the role of knowledge, technology and innovation in economic growth 
within the context of the “Green roads to growth” project.  It summarizes the current state of 
the art in this area, illustrates this with selected graphs and tables based on published statistics 
and raises issues for discussion.  The main focus is on the big shift of our understanding of 
economic growth that has taken place in recent decades, exemplified by emergence of terms 
such as “the knowledge based economy”, “the ICT revolution” and “innovation”, which - 
although not an entirely new issue – did not get much attention a few decades ago. Particular 
emphasis is placed on reviewing the new micro-evidence on innovation and the knowledge-
based economy that has emerged in recent years. However, since extensive micro-evidence on 
innovation and knowledge-based growth is available only for a limited number of developed 
economies, we also consider other types of indicators (that are available for a larger set of 
countries), and present a synthetic overview of the differences in performance across different 
parts of the globe. Finally we summarize the main trends and discuss the challenges posed by 
these for future growth, sustainability and policy. 
 
(*) I am indebted to Martin Srholec for assistance in producing many of the empirical 
illustrations used in this paper and to Mario Pianta and Jørgen Rosted for useful comments 
and suggestions. Remaining errors and omissions are my own responsibility. Address for 
correspondence is jan.fagerberg@tik.uio.no (P.O. Box 1108 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway).    2
 
Introduction   
 
It is difficult to find an issue that is more central to policy makers’ agenda than how to 
achieve economic growth. Indeed, it is generally acknowledged that economic growth is seen 
as essential for the realization of important policy objectives, such as income, welfare 
(including the environment) and – last but not least - employment. The ability of a country to 
foster economic growth and, hence, realize other important policy objectives is what is often 
termed the “competitiveness” of a country (Fagerberg 1988, 1996, Fagerberg, Knell and 
Srholec 2004). Therefore it comes as no surprise when policy makers in the European Union 
want to make Europe the most competitive region in the global knowledge based economy 
(the Lisbon agenda). What this means is simply to get the European Union on a growth path 
that is consistent with the realization of important policy objectives.  
Although this may sound simple enough experience tells us that getting there may not 
be just as simple. In fact, the EU has not come very far in realizing the ambitious goals of the 
Lisbon agenda, and concerns have been expressed on to what extent the political steps taken 
in order to do so are really appropriate.  This reminds us of the important insight that any 
policy aimed at raising long-term growth has to be based on a thorough understanding of the 
factors behind growth and the concrete circumstances into which the policy is going to be 
implemented. In the next sections we discuss the first of these issues in a bit more detail. 
Focus will be on the big shift of our understanding of economic growth that has taken place in 
recent decades, exemplified by emergence of terms such as  “the knowledge based economy” 
(which seems to be on everybody’s lips these days),  “the ICT revolution” and  “innovation” 
(which - although not an entirely new issue – did not get much attention a few decades ago). 
Particular emphasis is placed on reviewing the new micro-evidence on innovation and the 
knowledge-based economy that has emerged in recent years and the conclusions that can be 
drawn from this on how knowledge based growth works at what the scope for policy may be. 
However, extensive micro-evidence on innovation and knowledge-based growth is 
only available for a limited number of developed economies. To arrive at a more coherent 
picture of global dynamics we therefore broaden the scope to include other types of indicators 
that are available for a larger set of countries, and present a synthetic overview of the 
differences in performance across different parts of the globe. Finally we discuss the 
challenges posed by these current trends for future growth, including the issue of 
sustainability. As discussed already by the classical political economists two centuries ago, 
growth may be of two different kinds: A mere expansion of activity without a change in 
methods of production, or it may involve a change in the latter as well. While the former 
inevitably sooner or later will be constrained by limited natural resources, the latter may 
arguably escape the resource constraint – at least for the foreseeable future - by getting more 
out of less and changing the resource base. Indeed, without continuing technological and 
organizational change, growth will be impossible, because of the constraints posed by limited 
natural resources. Therefore innovation is key to sustainable growth and economic 
development on a global scale.
1  
                                                 
1 Innovation is also important for employment.  The introduction of new products (product innovation) is 
commonly acknowledged to have a clear positive effect on employment. But it has been argued that process 
innovation, due to its cost-cutting nature, may also displace jobs. However, such differences (in employment 
effects) between different types of innovations, while distinguishable at the level of the individual firm or 
industry, tend to become more blurred at the level of the overall economy. In fact, many economists go so far as 
to argue that the savings in costs, following a process innovation in a single firm or industry, by necessity will 
generate additional income and demand in the economy at large, which will “compensate” for any initial   3
Perspectives on growth: From mechanization to knowledge 
2 
 
Intuitively, most people easily accept the idea that knowledge and economic development is 
intimately related. However, this is not the way different levels of development used to be 
explained by economists. From the birth of the so-called “classical political economy” – a 
term invented by Karl Marx - two centuries ago, what economists have focused on when 
trying to explain differences in income or productivity is accumulated capital per worker. 
Similarly, differences in economic growth have been seen as reflecting different rates of 
capital accumulation. This perspective arguably reflects the important role played by 
“mechanization” as a mean for productivity advance during the so-called (first) industrial 
revolution, the period during which the frame of reference for much economic reasoning was 
formed. Closer to our own age Robert Solow adopted this perspective in his so-called 
“neoclassical growth theory” (Solow 1956). The theory predicted that, under otherwise 
similar circumstances, investments in poor countries (e.g. those with little capital) would be 
more profitable than in the richer ones, so that the former would be characterized by higher 
investment and faster economic growth than the latter. As a consequence of this logic, a 
narrowing of the development gap  (so-called “convergence”) should be expected.  Based on 
another argument borrowed from the classical political economists (reflecting their opposition 
towards mercantilist politics and feudal privileges), such convergence was by many 
economists deemed all the more probable; the less the state interfered with working of the 
“free” market. This gave birth to a particular approach to development policy, termed the 
“market friendly” approach associated, advocated by international agencies such as the IMF 
and the World Bank (see, for instance, World Bank 1993).  
The prediction that global capitalist dynamics would be accompanied by a 
convergence in income and productivity between initially poor and rich countries was an 
attractive one in many respects. It represented a liberal and optimistic view on global 
economic development. As long as governments did not interfere excessively in the working 
of markets, and limited itself to certain basic tasks, a happy ending was expected to be within 
sight. However, it is rare to see a prediction that is so completely rejected by the evidence as 
this one is. In fact, the history of capitalism from the industrial revolution onwards is one of 
increasing differences in productivity and living conditions across different parts of the globe. 
According to one source, 250 years ago the difference in income or productivity per head 
between the richest and poorest country in the world was approximately 5:1, while more 
recently this difference has increased to 400:1 (Landes 1998).  But in spite of this long run 
trend towards divergence in productivity and income, there are many examples of (initially) 
backward countries that – at different times – have managed to narrow the gap in productivity 
and income between themselves and the frontier countries, in other words, to “catch up”. 
Japan in the decades before and after the Second World War and the “Asian tigers” more 
recently are obvious examples.  
This diversity in performance across countries on different levels of development is 
not limited long historical periods (centuries) but is even more characteristic today. As an 
illustration of this Figure 1 plots growth in GDP per capita (horizontal axis) versus its level 
(vertical axis) for a large sample of countries during the last quarter of a century. In this way 
                                                                                                                                                          
negative effects of a process innovation on overall employment. The issue remains highly controversial, and we 
will not discuss it in further depth here. For a good, up-todate overview of the literature on innovation and 
employment see Pianta (2004). 
2 Some of the text in this section draws on my paper “Knowledge in space: What hope for the poor parts of the 
globe?, presented at a conference organized by EC, OECD and NSF-US on Advancing Knowledge and the 
Knowledge Economy in Washington January 10-11, 2005,  forthcoming in D. Foray and B. Kahin. 
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four quadrants emerge. Up to the left you have initially rich countries that grow slowly 
(“losing momentum”), down to the right initially poor countries that grow fast (e.g. “catching 
up”). If the global economy is on a converging path, the great majority of countries will 
cluster in these two quadrants. But this is not the case, the majority of countries clearly belong 
to the remaining quadrants; up to the right initially rich countries that continue to move ahead 
of the others (“moving ahead”) and down to the left poor countries that grow slowly (“falling 
behind”). As is evident from the graph the latter group consists to a large extent of African   
countries (joined by some Latin American and Asian ones and some former members of the 
USSR or its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe). 
 
  




Source: GGDC (2005). 
 
Table 1 illustrates this tendency towards divergence in a more substantive fashion by 
reporting data for levels of growth in GDP per capita for major players in the global economy. 
It should be noted that the means reported in the table are population weighted to avoid an 
unwanted influence of small countries (which dominate in terms of mere numbers but not in 
terms of population or GDP) on the reported statistics. As is evident from the table the 
performance of low-income economies differs greatly. While China and some other Asian   5
economies catch up at a rapid rate, countries in Eastern Europe and the CIS
3 and African 
countries hardly grow at all (fall behind). However, there are also signs of divergence 
between more advanced economies recently, with United States doing somewhat better in 
terms of GDP per capita growth than its counterparts in Europe. The latter difference, it might 
be noted, is even more striking in GDP growth since employment is developing more 
favourably in the United States than in the European union. 
 
Table 1: GDP per capita by regions over 1980-2003 (in PPPs, population weighted) 
 
   GDP per capita 
(in thousands of 1990 USD)  Average annual growth (in %) 
   1980  1990  2003  80-90  90-03  80-03 
European Union (25)  11,994*  14,358  17,784  1.9*  1.7  1.8* 
O/w  EU-north  14,176  17,046  20,415  1.9  1.4  1.6 
        EU-south   11,048  13,849  17,350  2.3  1.7  2.0 
        EU-new members  6,386*  6,686  8,611  -0.3*  2.0  1.2* 
United States  18,577  23,201  29,208  2.2  1.8  2.0 
Japan 13,428  18,789  21,373  3.4  1.0  2.0 
Asian Tigers  5,306  9,975  17,120  6.5  4.2  5.2 
China 1,067  1,858  4,429  5.7  6.9  6.4 
Asia (other developing countries)  1,510  1,924  2,834  2.5  3.0  2.8 
Latin America  5,781  5,351  6,051  -0.8  1.0  0.2 
East Europe and CIS  6,199  6,510  5,246  0.5  -1.6  -0.7 
Africa 1,672  1,581  1,646  -0.6  0.3  -0.1 
World 4,678  5,417  6,821  1.5  1.8  1.7 
 
Note: *) Data is missing for Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Source: GGDC (2005). 
 
How to explain this diversity in patterns of development? Is it related to a superior 
ability to develop and/or exploit knowledge in the successful countries, as many perhaps 
would suspect?   As noted in the introduction, theoretical work for a long time tended to 
ignore the role of knowledge in development (Fagerberg 1994). This was not only caused by 
the fact that economists’ focus for historical reasons was elsewhere. It also had to do with a 
particular view on knowledge that came to dominate economics, that is knowledge as a so-
called “public good” or a body of information, freely available to all interested, that can be 
used over and over again (without being depleted). Arguably, if this is what knowledge is 
about, it should be expected to benefit everybody all over the globe to the same extent, and 
hence cannot be invoked as an explanation of differences in growth performance. Hence, 
following the logic, the real reasons behind such differences must rest elsewhere. Moreover, if 
everybody benefits to the same extent, why should anybody care to provide it? For a long 
time many economists found this question so perplexing that they chose to ignore knowledge 
altogether (i.e., regard it as a factor that is alien to economic reasoning, or “exogenous” as it is 
conventionally expressed).  
More recently economists such as Paul Romer put an end to this practice by 
suggesting that knowledge, in the above “public good” sense, is a by-product of investments 
that firms undertake in order to develop new products and services (Romer 1990). The reason 
why, following this view, firms find it profitable to do so is that intellectual property rights 
(patents etc.) give them sufficient protection to secure a healthy private return on their 
investments. Hence, following this approach, how intellectual property rights are catered for 
                                                 
3 The Council of Independent States (CIS) consists of former Soviet Union member states.    6
(including legal and institutional aspects) may have a very important impact on the economy . 
The social returns are, at least on average,
4 assumed to be even higher, enhancing the pool of 
public, freely available knowledge, and spurring growth. If such pools of knowledge can be 
assumed to be “national” in character, models based on this perspective (so-called “new 
growth theory”) might yield predictions consistent with the observed long-run tendency 
towards divergence in GDP per capita (with large countries - with large “national” knowledge 
stocks - in a particularly good position). However, such an assumption would be difficult to 
justify, given the perspective on knowledge underlying the approach (a body of information). 
Indeed, the logic of the argument clearly suggests that such freely available knowledge would 
not be bound to (geographical) context and hence should be expected to benefit all countries.  
Should we accept that knowledge is not an important factor behind the vast 
differences in income across different parts of the globe? Or is there something fundamentally 
wrong with the way knowledge is conceived by the theoreticians? We put our bets on the 
latter. When Robert Solow and others started to model growth more than fifty years ago, there 
was not a lot of work available on knowledge and innovation in firms. However, during the 
last two decades we have seen a proliferation of work in thin area, with several big surveys, 
numerous case studies and a lot of interpretative work, and we now know a good deal more 
about how firms search for, develop and use new knowledge. Surprisingly, this new 
“knowledge on knowledge” does not seem to have been exploited much by the theoreticians 
in their attempts to construct models of knowledge based growth. Although innovation is now 
generally recognized as key to growth, formal models of growth, in particular, typically 
embody very abstract assumptions on how innovations are brought about, which arguably are 
not of much help for policymaking. Policy makers are therefore struggling with how to 
transform these new insights on growth into workable policies, and the European Union’s 
Lisboa/Barcelona process may in fact serve an illustration of this.  
  
Understanding innovation based dynamics: Conceptual framework and 
empirical evidence   
 
During the last two decades innovation has increasingly become a central focus for policy 
makers. The reason for this is the central role innovation is assumed to play for income and 
employment growth (and quality of life more generally). It is increasingly recognized that 
high quality science and R&D is not sufficient for the realization of important social 
objectives. New ideas, important as they may be (with potentially far-reaching consequences), 
have little economic and social impact unless carried out into practice. This – carrying new 
ideas out into practice – is what innovation is about, and that is why it so important. 
For a long time this seemingly innocent step – carrying new ideas out into practice – 
was not seen as very significant. The major focus, among policy makers and academics, was 
on the process prior to the first attempt of commercialisation of a new idea, e.g.,  science and 
research (within large public and private sector organizations). As long as investments in 
science and R&D were kept at a high level, it was assumed that the derived social and 
economic benefits would follow. This perspective on innovation  - which later became known 
as “the linear model ” (Kline and Rosenberg 1986) - has typically been used to legitimate 
large public investments in science and R&D. It continues to be an influential view, 
                                                 
4 Since new technology displace old technology, and hence makes investments made in the latter obsolete, 
social returns may also in some cases be less than (the sum of) the private returns (see Aghion and Howitt 1998). 
We will not discuss this possibility further here,   7
particularly among policy makers. For instance, this type of reasoning concurs well with the 
recently announced EU policy of raising its expenditure of R&D to the 3% of GDP level. 
However, although few would deny that science and R&D play important roles in long 
run economic social and change, the exact nature of these relationships has been subject to 
considerable controversy. Partly this had to do with the problems in identifying empirically 
the links between investments in science and R&D and the assumed economic benefits. 
Another source for raising new questions about innovation comes from a diverse body of 
empirical research on innovation processes in firms. Although some of it dates way back, this 
research has been especially vibrant in recent years, particularly in Europe (the so-called 
Community Innovation Survey – CIS). The CIS survey, now in its third version (Eurostat 
2004), shows that, apart from internal sources, interaction with users is the most important 
source of innovation for firms followed by contacts with suppliers, participation at 
fairs/exhibitions and impulses from competitors (Figure 2). Contacts with the public R&D 
infrastructure (universities and research institutes) are generally considered to be of much 
lesser importance. Although there are some differences in results across countries and/or 
industries, the ranking of the various sources in terms of their importance is remarkably 
robust. The biggest difference is actually between firms of different sizes; large firms 
consistently value external sources of innovation more highly than do small firms. 
 
Figure 2. The Community Innovation Survey: Evaluation of external sources of 
information used in innovation 
 
Very important sources of innovation: How 
European firms see it














Source: Eurostat (2004) 
 
 
This is not to say that universities do not have an important role to play in a 
knowledge based economy, but according to firms the most important impacts are of an 
indirect nature, such as through the supply of highly educated and skilled personnel. 
Admittedly, these findings may seem to be at odds with the widespread expectations among 
university administrators these days of substantial future incomes to universities from direct 
involvement in innovation activities (through intellectual property rights - IPRs).  However, 
available evidence from the US, which spearheaded this movement, indicate that for most 
universities that have followed this trajectory, establishing an IPR system has in fact been a 
pure financial loss (Mowery 2004).   Arguably, the type knowledge on which much recent   8
discussion of this subject focuses, e.g., codified information that is patented and traded in 
markets (or not patented and hence provided for free), is only one among several types of 
economically relevant knowledge (albeit an important one).  In fact, there is now a large body 
of research showing that firms generally do not regard patenting as the most important way to 
protect their knowledge (Foray 2004, Granstrand 2004, Figure 3 below). This does not imply 
that there may not be segments within certain sectors or industries that are different in these 
respects (the biotechnology industry is the prime example) but the general picture is a 
different one.  
  





















The truth of the matter is that in most areas of knowledge, there is a long way from 
scientific discoveries to commercial exploitation. Lags of several decades or more are not 
uncommon (Rogers 1995, Fagerberg 2004). Technological activities of firms seldom take 
abstract scientific principles as point of departure and search for commercial applications 
(although that may happen). The general pattern is that of a perceived need among customers, 
a problem that needs to be solved, which generates a search for relevant knowledge. Research 
emphasizes that, in most cases, firms only have imperfect knowledge on the relevant options 
in front of them, and that they tend to be myopic, searching, internally at first, then in the 
neighbourhood of their existing competence/network (Nelson and Winter 1982, Dosi 1988,  
Cohen and Levinthal 1990, van der Ven et al. 1999). Consistent with this, as illustrated in 
Figure 2 above, the most highly valued external sources are typically customers and suppliers. 
The finding that innovation does not only depend on firms’ own (internal) efforts, but 
also on interaction (and knowledge sharing) with external actors, such as customers and 
suppliers, led during the 1990s to the formulation of a new approach (“systems of 
innovation”, see Lundvall 1992 and Nelson 1993), which explicitly attempts to take the 
systemic (or recurring) character of such patterns of interactions more thoroughly into 
account. This system approach, in its various versions, has become popular among policy 
makers and analysts, among other things due to its flexible structure (which means that it can 
easily be adapted to different settings/issues) and the fact that it offers a handy framework for 




















Innovation: Not only (or mainly) 
about patents …
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initiatives/support schemes and firm behaviour. Although it has been argued that (perhaps 
because of this flexibility) the approach lacks precision when it comes to making statements 
on causality and providing policy advice (Fagerberg 2003, Edquist 2004), the correlation 
between the extent of innovation-cooperation and GDP per capita is very strong, indicating 
that innovation-cooperation pays off (Figure 4). 
  


















Source: Own calculations based on Trendchart Innovation Scoreboard 2 and Eurostat (2004) 
 
 
What much recent work in this area boils down to is that some of the popular folklore 
surrounding the innovation phenomenon, focusing for instance on the construction of 
technologically very demanding devices, based on scientific breakthroughs, occurring in big 
laboratories with the help of very advanced and expensive equipment etc., may be a bit one-
sided. Albeit some innovations are of this sort, many are not, including a lot of those that 
matter economically. In fact, innovation is not limited to certain so-called high-tech 
industries, but flourishes in other industries as well, not to speak of services (von Tunzelmann 
and Acha 2004, Miles 2004), although the factors that matter for innovation (and 
consequently the available policy options) may vary somewhat from one sector to another 
(Malerba 2004).  Although some innovations may be spectacular technological 
breakthroughs, the bulk of innovation in modern societies consists of relatively small 
improvements and it is probably a safe bet that the cumulative impact of these is as great (or 
greater) than that of the more “radical” or “revolutionary” ones.  
 Moreover, a key lesson from modern innovation research is that not only 
technological innovations of the product and process type, which are what people often use to 
focus on, matter but that organizational innovations are very important as well. In fact, many 
of the most important innovations throughout history have been of the organizational kind 
such as, for instance, the new distribution system that accompanied the development of mass 
production in the US a century ago, or how Toyota and other Japanese companies reorganized 
the entire value chain in the car industry in the period following the end of the Second World 
War (Bruland and Mowery 2004, Fagerberg and Godinho 2004, Lam 2004). Although some 
organizational innovations have followed in the wake of technological breakthroughs, and 
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advances, organizational innovation may also be an important impetus to growth in its own 
right (the Japanese experience in the car industry is arguably an example of this).  
Thus we now have relatively extensive evidence from several countries, based on 
surveys of innovation activities of firms, that consistently shows that what generally matters 
most for successful innovation is not so much the link with basic science, big public 
laboratories or universities, or IPRs for that sake, but close interaction with users (demand), 
suppliers and competitors (Granstrand 2004, Smith 2004, von Hippel 2005). These lessons 
may raise important questions for policy. Arguably, in many cases the policy discourse tends 
to focus too much on the resources available for innovation, e.g., R&D, rather than innovation 
as such, which – if anything - should be the prime target for policy. For instance, a well-
known concern among policy makers has been that of too little investments in R&D 
compared to other countries. But such comparisons tend to forget that these figures may 
reflect differences in specialization patterns, since R&D intensities differ a lot across 
industries, and countries for various reasons specialize (and distribute their R&D) differently 
across industries/sectors. In fact, there are much larger differences across countries in R&D 
efforts than in GDP per capita (which is what matters most in the end). Arguably, it is not 
obvious that it would be a good idea to regard the industrial structure of a country as obsolete, 
just because it is not high R&D.  As pointed out by von Tunzelmann and Acha (2004), there 
may be a lot to gain economically from investing in innovation (including R&D) in industries 
with more modest R&D requirements. On the other hand, it is perfectly possible that there 
may be industries (or industrial segments) for which the prospects are far from promising, so 
that a gradual reorientation would be more than justified. However, to be able to deal with 
such issues in a constructive manner, a relatively detailed analysis of a country’s innovation 
system – its strength, weaknesses as well the external challenges with which it will be 
confronted – would be required.  Concentrating all the attention on a specific number – R&D 
as a percentage of GDP – may be of little help in this regard. 
 














Source: Trendchart Innovation Scoreboard 2002 
It is also important to keep in mind that differences in aggregate R&D intensities 
across developed economies are mostly due to differences in private, not public investments 
in R&D (which tend to be more equal across the developed world). Private investments in 
R&D, on the other hand, depend on a number of factors, such as for instance the strategic 
orientation of management, the costs, the perceived risk, the demand for new, innovative 
products or services and the extent to which R&D is deemed necessary to be able catering for 
this demand. Hence, innovation and R&D are jointly decided. If demand is failing or risk 
considered too high (which may in some cases amount to the same thing), innovation projects 
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Focusing exclusively on the amount of R&D investment, instead of innovation and the wider 
set of factors that influences it, may in fact not be so fruitful.  
The global knowledge economy and the ICT revolution    
 
In some sense growth has always been knowledge-based, so one might think that what we 
have witnessed is more a shift in perspective than in the way the global economy works. 
There is some truth in this statement but we shall argue that there is more to it than that.  
Since extensive micro-evidence on innovation and knowledge-based growth of the type 
considered above is available for a limited number of countries only, we will in this section 
broaden the scope to include other types of indicators, available for a larger set of countries, 
that in various ways reflect the roles that knowledge and innovation play in the economy. The 
first broadly available indicator that we will consider is patenting in the United States. There 
are a few things to note here. First, in contrast to what is often taken for granted, patents 
reflect invention not innovation. The great majority of inventions never reach the innovation 
stage, and many innovations are never patented. Hence, patenting is only a very partial 
measure of innovation, with a clear bias towards (potentially) valuable codifiable knowledge 
that is easy to copy/distribute and hence may depend on legal protection for its realization. 
Second, since patent systems differ across countries, comparative analyses are commonly 
restricted to patenting in one single country (due to its share size the US market is normally 
preferred).
5 
  The patent data reported in Table 2 illustrate several important trends. The first is the 
rapid increase in patenting over time. This increase is especially evident for ICT patents, the 
number of which increased by a factor of five during the last quarter of a century (compared 
to a mere doubling for total patents). This clearly reflects the crucial role played by innovation 
and diffusion of ICTs during this period, as well as the important role played by patenting in 
the ICT industry. The second important trend is the almost total lack of patenting in the US 
market by developing country firms. This does, of course, not imply that such firms do not 
innovate at all but that in most cases the innovations they undertake are not patented (or 
patentable), as will be the case for many minor innovations. Among the developed countries, 
the US performance is of course impressive (but difficult to interpret given the lack of assured 
comprability). However, what is even more striking is the very rapid growth in Japanese 
patenting in the US market, with a level in 2004 on pair with the US performance (total 
patents) and clearly above the US for ICT patents. Patenting by the Asian Tigers (Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) grew even faster, from an almost negligible level to a 
level well above the European average. Thus for what it is worth, the data seem to confirm the 
leading role played by US – and increasingly so – Japanese firms in the global knowledge 
economy, with European firms lagging considerably behind, recently overtaken by Asian 
                                                 
5 It is generally acknowledged that the propensity of American residents to register inventions in their own 
national patent office (USPTO) is higher than that of non-residents, and that this creates an upward “home 
country bias” in the statistics (that needs to be corrected for to allow for international comparisons based on the 
USPTO data).  Following Archibugi and Coco (2004) we adjust for this bias by taking into account information 
on US and Japanese patents registered at the European Patent Office (EPO). The assumption is that since Europe 
a foreign market both for American and Japanese inventors there should no bias in the propensity to patent for 
inventors from these countries in the European market (while data for European inventors in the European 
market will be biased of course). The formula used is the following  (see Archibugi and Coco 2004, p. 633): 
Adjusted US patents at the USPTO = (JAPUSA * USAEPO)/ JAPEPO 
where JAPUSA represents patents granted to Japanese residents in the United States, while USAEPO and JAPEPO 
capture patents granted to American and Japanese residents at the EPO.  
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Tiger firms as well. This appears to confirm the widespread worry that Europe is not adapting 




Table 2: Patents granted at the USPTO by regions (per million people) 
 
 Total  patents  ICT  patents 
  1980 1990 2004 1980 1990 2004 
European  Union  (25)  32.0 40.6 55.0  4.6  7.1 17.2 
O/w    EU-north  52.2 65.4 88.1  7.6 11.8 28.2 
        EU-south  7.7  12.2  15.9  1.1  1.6  3.6 
        EU-new members  2.5  2.0  2.0  0.2  0.2  0.4 
United  States  163.7 189.7 286.2  27.5  39.9 122.7 
Japan  61.1 158.1 277.5  15.1  57.2 146.9 
Asian  Tigers  1.7 14.2  135.7  0.2  2.6 69.5 
China  0.0 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Asia  (other  developing  countries)  0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Latin  America  0.3 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 
East  Europe  and  CIS  1.6 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 
Africa  0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 
World  14.0 17.2 26.0  2.4  4.0 11.3 
Note: The “home country advantage” of United States in the USPTO patents is adjusted according to an 
estimation method proposed by Archibugi and Coco (2004, p. 633). 
Source: OECD (2005a). 
 
Does this picture withstand scrutiny? For this purpose we report in Table 3 data for three 
related indicators; R&D expenditure, production of scientific articles and ISO 9000 
certifications in the last decade or so. Compared to patents R&D clearly is a broader indicator, 
reflecting efforts/capabilities of relevance for invention, innovation and absorption of 
technology/knowledge.  Hence it may be seen as a reflection of what is commonly called 
“technological” or “absorptive” capacity, e.g., the ability to not only develop but also to 
identify, acquire and use new knowledge (Kim 1997, Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Consistent 
with this it has a much more egalitarian distribution across countries than patents. The rapid 
increase in Chinese R&D is especially noteworthy (Dahlman and Aubert 2001). But also 
Japan and the Asian tigers increase their R&D efforts significantly over the last decade. As in 
the case of patenting, the dominating R&D performers are the US, Japan and the Asian 
Tigers, but this time with Japan in a comfortable lead (as a percentage of GDP). Europe is, 
again, lagging behind the frontier. However, Europe is doing better in science (articles), on 
pair with Japan in fact, but still below the United States. Europe is also doing well on ISO 
9000 certifications, especially in the South. Japan too is performing reasonably well on this 
dimension.   13
 
Table 3:  Technological capabilities: Selected indicators 
 
  R&D expenditure ¨ 
(% of GDP) 
S&E articles 
(per million people) 
ISO 9000 certifications 
(per million people) 
 1993 2003 1991 2001 1993  2003
European Union (25)  1.8 1.8 366 496 83  539
o/w  EU-north  2.2 2.3 517 649 141  453
        EU-south  1.0 1.1 201 362 11  860
        EU-new members  0.9 0.8 115 181 1  322
United States  2.5 2.6 767 704 8  143
Japan 2.8 3.2 319 452 3  438
Asian Tigers  1.7 2.3 75 316 12  274
China 0.7 1.3 5 14 0  75
A s i a  ( o t h e r  d e v e l o p i n g  c o u n t r i e s )   0 . 5 0 . 6790   1 4
Latin America  0.5 0.6 15 31 0  23
East Europe and CIS  0.9 1.1 5 66 0  37
A f r i c a  0 . 5 0 . 5971   5
World 1.7 1.8 90 106 8  91
 
Note: Data on R&D refer to the nearest year available to 1993 and 2003. 
Source: OECD (2005b), RICYT (2005), NSF (2005), ISO (2004). 
 
Hence the picture that suggests itself is one of a high performing US, a highly sophisticated 
and productive (but slow-growing) Japan and a number of other Asian economies rapidly 
catching up both technologically and economically. Europe on the other hand appears 
increasingly to stagnate and lag behind along most dimensions. It is important to note that the 
share size of some of these rapidly growing Asian economies is bound of to have an important 
impact on the global knowledge economy. As shown in Figure 6 below, today about one third 
of global R&D is done in Asia, about the same as in the USA and well ahead of the EU (one 
quarter). China alone stands for about one tenth of global R&D (and rapidly increasing).  
 
 
Figure  6: Concentration of R&D expenditure in the world economy (in PPPs) 
 
 
Note: Data on R&D refer to the nearest year available to 1993 and 2003. The group of other Asian countries also 
includes Asian Tigers. Source: OECD (2005b).   14
However, Europe consists of many different countries, so to better account for this diversity 
we include in Figure 7 the fifteen highest-ranking countries along the four indicators 
considered above. It is interesting to note that the countries with the best performance 
generally are small countries, several of which are European. Four small countries in 
particular generally obtain a high rank; Finland, Israel, Sweden and Switzerland. This is 
particularly so for scientific publications and R&D. For patenting the US, Japan and Taiwan 
are the frontrunners but immediately followed by the above “gang of four”.  The ranking on 
ISO 9000 indicators tends to deviate a bit from the other indicators but two of these four small 
countries are among the four top performers in this case too. Hence the relatively mediocre 
rating for Europe on the indicators considered here is not the result of a uniform pattern. 
Primarily it reflects the performance of the larger European economies. 
 
 
Figure 7: Top 15 countries by selected indicators of technological capabilities 
 
 
Note: Data on R&D refer to the nearest year available to 1993 and 2003. 
Source: OECD (2005ab), RICYT (2005), NSF (2005), ISO (2004). 
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Tables 4 and 5 contain information on another important aspect of technological capability, 
what is often termed “human capital”, e.g., the level of education of the population/labour 
force.  As is evident from table 4, enrolment in secondary schooling has been high for most 
developed economies for a long time. Historically, enrolment rates have been much lower in 
the developing part of the word, but have recently started to rise there as well. However, 
despite this increase, enrolment in secondary education is still low in Africa and parts of Asia. 
There are much larger differences in tertiary enrolment. The first thing to note is the 
very special position of the United States. If we go back 25 years, more than half of the 
relevant age group in the US was enrolled in tertiary education, compared to less than one 
quarter in Western Europe. Although the United States continues to be in the lead in this area, 
over time the differences between the US and other developed economies have been reduced, 
and the level of tertiary enrolment has increased in most countries. But tertiary enrolment 




Table 4: School enrolment by regions (gross enrolment ratios) 
 
   Secondary schooling  Tertiary schooling 
    1980 1990 2002 1980 1990 2002 
European  Union  82 92  121 23 32 60 
o/w    EU-north  87 97  139 24 36 61 
        EU-south  75  90  106  23  33  60 
        EU-new members  83  84  103  18  21  56 
United  States  91 93 94 56 75 83 
Japan  93 97  102 31 30 51 
Asian  Tigers  75 87 90 14 31 67 
China  46 49 70  2  3 16 
Asia (other developing countries)  31  42  56  6  8  14 
Latin  America  42 49 89 13 17 27 
East Europe and CIS  95  92  93  37  42  54 
Africa  21  29  37 4 5 9 
World  49 55 70 13 16 26 
 
Note: Averages weighted by country’s population. 
Source: USAID (2004) and World Bank (2005). 
 
 
The fact that US enrolment rates were so much higher than elsewhere a few decades ago 
transforms into a much higher share of population with completed tertiary education today 
(Table 5). This puts the United States in a unique position; around one third of its labour force 
has completed tertiary education, compared to around one sixth of the labour force in Japan 
and the Asian Tigers and one tenth of the labour force in the European Union. To the extent 
that contemporary technological progress is skill-biased (Acemoglu 2002, Pianta 2004), the 
unique position of the United States in this regard may explain some of the superior 
performance of the US economy when compared to other developed economies recently. 
However, in many developing economies the level of skills is still much lower. For instance, 
in China only one of every fifty members of the labour force (over 25 years of age) has 
completed tertiary education. This together with relatively low enrolment rates indicate that 
for China and other countries in a similar situation the skill-level of the labour force will 
continue to be low for many years ahead.   16
Table 5: Share of population with completed schooling (in %; age over 25) 
 
   Secondary schooling  Tertiary schooling 
    1980 1990 2000 1980 1990 2000 
European  Union  15 18 18  5  7 10 
O/w    EU-north  19 21 20  5  7 11 
        EU-south  9  12  13  3  5  9 
        EU-new members  12  17  18  5  7  10 
United  States  47 24 22 18 27 30 
Japan  15 16 17  9 13 15 
Asian  Tigers  17 29 30  6  8 15 
China  6 14 14  1  2  2 
Asia  (other  developing  countries)  5 7 8 2 3 4 
Latin  America  5 7 8 4 6 8 
East  Europe  and  CIS  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Africa  2 4 7 1 2 3 
World  9 11 12  3  5  6 
 
Note: Average weighted by country’s population. 
Source: Barro and Lee (2000).  
 
  
ICT is a much-heralded factor in economic growth, epitomized by the protagonists of the so-
called “new economy” perspective on growth and development. Although the popularity of 
the concept “new economy” faded somewhat after the crash of the Internet bubble, the ICT 
revolution is a real phenomenon that should not be taken lightly. Not only has it created 
powerful new industries (and unbelievably rich industrial tycoons) but it has also 
revolutionized  “how things are done” in many if not most areas of economic and social life. 
In fact the latter is what is meant by a technological revolution (Freeman and Louca 2001). 
Although the new industries that emerge are important drivers of growth in their own right, 
the major economic effects arguably come through the diffusion and application of ICTs 
throughout the economy and the continuing improvements that follow in the wake of these 
processes. Therefore, the extent to which a country manages to benefit from the ICT 
revolution will not primarily depend on its ability to develop into a competitive location for 
production and export of ICT products, which after all not every country can succeed in 
doing, but on the ability of the country to successfully diffuse and apply ICT technology 
throughout the economy. Thus, if one is interested in the relationship between ICT and 
economic growth, especially in a comparative perspective, it is very instructive to look at 
diffusion rates for major ICT products, which is the approach adopted here.   
  Figure 8 illustrates the ongoing character of the ICT revolution by comparing diffusion 
rates for an “old ICT” – mainline telephony – with three new technologies that emerge from 
the ICT revolution; PCs, the Internet and Mobile telephony. As is evident from the graph 
mainline telephony – which was invented more than a century ago – continue to diffuse at a 
relatively rapid rate. In the beginning of the 1990s there was one telephone per ten people in 
the world at large, in 2003 the density of mainline telephones had increased to one per six 
persons. One should perhaps have expected that the speed of diffusion, as indicated by the 
slope of the graph, would be much higher for the new ICTs, and this clearly applies for both 
mobile telephony and internet use (which have developed very rapidly from an almost 
negligible level ten years ago). In fact the spread of mobile telephony has now surpassed that 
of the older technology (mainlines) and Internet use is not far behind. But, interestingly, the 
diffusion of PCs, an arguably much more costly (and demanding) technology compared to,   17
say, mobile telephony, has been much slower. Still there is less than one computer per ten 
persons in the world at large. This indicates that diffusion of ICTs still has a long way to go. 
   



















European Union  324  366  520  817 
o/w  EU-north  429  440  604  809 
        EU-south  197  274  458  960 
        EU-new members  161  258  325  614 
United States  660  556  621  543 
Japan 382  483  472  679 
Asian Tigers  526  533  550  862 
China 28  63  209  215 
Asia (other developing countries)  17  32  59  75 
Latin America  68  90  169  233 
East Europe and CIS  69  53  216  199 
Africa 14  15  29  60 
World 101  113  186  228 
 
Source: ITU (2005) and World Bank (2005). 
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Table 6 reproduces the same indicators for major countries and regions of the global economy 
for the most recent year available (2003). This shows that ICTs are very unevenly distributed 
across the global economy. Diffusion rates in Africa are only a small fraction of those in the 
developed part of the world. This applies to all ICTs but is most evident for PCs and the 
Internet. But as in other areas there are important differences within the developed world as 
well. In general the US is in the lead in the diffusion of new ICTs, especially PC and Internet 
technology, closely followed by the Asian Tigers and – at a certain distance – Japan and the 
European Union.  However, the Europan Union is doing better than the US in the diffusion of 
mobile telephony, in which it is second only to the Asian Tigers. Interestingly, mobile 
telephony is the only major ICT technology that has caught on in the poorer part of the world. 
In Africa for instance, although still at a low level, there are four times as many mobile 
telephone users than PC or Internet users. 
  As with other types of statistics these overviews may mask important differences 
within the aggregates. We therefore plot in Figure 9 the indicators for the top fifteen countries 
along each of the four indicators considered above. It is interesting to note that although the 
United States is relatively high up on the list for diffusion of PC and Internet technology (but 
not mobile telephony) the position of the country is by no means exceptional. In fact it is 
joined as being among the world leaders in ICT use not only by the Asian Tigers (as might be 
expected from the evidence considered above) but also by a bunch of smaller European 
economies. In fact on every indicator in Figure 9 about one half of the top fifteen performers 
are small European countries such as, to mention some prominent examples, the Nordic 
countries, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Hence, the relatively modest 
performance of the European Union as a whole in the diffusion of some core ICT 
technologies when compared to, say, the USA and some Asian economies, is primarily caused 
by developments in the larger member countries.     19 




Source: ITU (2005) and World Bank (2005). 
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Another important aspect of the ICT revolution may be its relationship with knowledge 
(Foray 2004).  According to some analysts the exact relationship between growth and 
knowledge has changed due to ICTs, making knowledge more footloose and hence 
challenging the competitive positions of well-established locations for economic activity in 
Europe and elsewhere, favouring poorer economies and giving a strong impetus to 
“convergence” in productivity and income in the global economy. This is an important issue 
for which “hard” evidence is hard to come by (and which we consequently will not venture 
into in great detail here, see Ernst, Fagerberg  and Hildrum (2002) for an extended 
discussion). However, while it is true that knowledge codification has been on the increase for 
centuries, and that this continues at an accelerated rate in the present ICT era, much 
economically relevant knowledge is not of this form. For a firm to profit from knowledge, 
whether through exploitation of existing or creation of new knowledge, what is required is the 
ability to combine many different kinds of knowledge/capabilities, of which some may not be 
codified and have little to do with science or technology in the received sense. For instance, it 
has been shown that relevant skills in combination with the ability to undertake adequate 
organizational changes are of critical importance for being able to profit from new ICTs 
(Bresnahan, Brynjolfson and Hitt 2002).  Hence, although the ICT revolution has affected 
economic growth in a major way, and is likely to continue to do so for a considerable period 
of time, it is in itself not likely lead to increased convergence in productivity and income 
across the globe. In fact, the effect may just as likely be the opposite one if current trends 
towards a very uneven distribution of ICTs globally (the “digitial divide”) are not reversed. 
  
Summing up the argument – implications for policy   
 
This section will sum up some of the “stylized facts” that emerge from the analysis. Are there 
groups of countries emerging that position themselves quite differently with respect to the 
growth of the global knowledge-based economy? What are the possible implications of this 
with respect to growth and convergence? Are the policy initiatives that have been developed 
in Europe, such as those originating from the Lisbon/Barcelona summits, appropriate in this 
new situation? And what about the longer term (and the need for a transition to a sustainable 
growth path)?  
  However, let us first delve into what is implied by the term “knowledge based 
economy” and the extent to which it raises new challenges and opportunities for economic 
growth at the country level. In short, based on the evidence considered in this paper, can we 
affirmatively decide the extent to which there is something fundamentally new to “the 
knowledge economy” or if it – alternatively - is “old wine in new bottles”?  If pressed on the 
subject I would say yes to the former and no to the latter. As pointed out previously 
knowledge has always been important for economic development but the way it operates 
today is new compared to situation, say, a century ago. This change is the combined effect of 
several important trends, some of which have gone on for a long time and some that are more 
recent. First it is the rise of innovation as an organized activity within firms. A century ago 
devoting resources to R&D and innovation was very rare. Today leading companies realize 
that without it they will not survive for long. This process of change started in Germany a 
century ago, continued in the US from the Second World War onwards (Nelson and Wright 
(1992) and has since spread to most of the globe. Hence as a global phenomenon it is fairly 
recent. The second important trend is the rise of what we may term a supportive R&D (or 
innovation) infrastructure – and a corresponding policy field - at the regional and/or national 
level, what is today commonly studied under the heading of “systems of innovation” (Edquist 
2004). This is clearly a post-Second World War phenomenon (and in most countries much   21
more recent than that). Third it is the massification of higher (tertiary) education, which 
started in the US after the Second World War and then spread to other developed countries. In 
most countries this is a very recent phenomenon, the full consequences of which have not yet 
been felt.  And finally it is the ICT revolution, which has made it possible to create 
knowledge infrastructures that make it possible to search, combine and recombine knowledge 
and information much quicker and efficient than before. As is evident from the diffusion 
statistics surveyed above this process is still at an early stage. 
  The evidence considered in this paper clearly illustrates the dynamic character of the 
emerging knowledge based economy along all the four dimensions mentioned above; 
innovation, R&D infrastructure, higher education and ICT. The rapid growth of patenting 
worldwide, the catch-up in R&D expenditure as well as GDP per capita in several (previously 
poor) Asian economies,  the massification of higher education and the rapid spread of new 
ICTs throughout the global economy all testify to the strength of this dynamics. However, this 
is not a process that benefits every country in the world to the some extent. On the contrary 
the available evidence seems to suggest that for some time now differences in GDP per capita 
between the dynamic (mostly rich) and less dynamic (mostly poor) parts of the world have 
been in increasing, and that this emerging divide is also mirrored in indicators of innovation, 
R&D infrastructure, higher education and ICT. However, this is not merely an increasing 
“north-south” divide, since some initially poor countries in Asia, China in particular, manage 
to catch-up. Moreover, there diverging tendencies at work within what we like to think of as 
the developed world, with in particular the European Union performing less well than, say, 
the United States and parts of Asia. These tendencies understandably worry policy-makers in 
the EU who have launched several policy initiatives to revitalize the growth and 
competitiveness of the European economy.   
   The chief policy goal that European policy makers have agreed on is to try to raise 
R&D investments towards the three percent of GDP target. However, although high R&D 
investment is an important indicator of a thriving knowledge-based economy, it does not 
follow that increasing R&D without changing anything else would necessarily change much. 
What is needed is a more holistic policy approach based on a solid understanding of the 
factors that induce (or hamper) R&D and innovation. Since interaction with users (and user 
competence) has been shown to be perhaps the most important factor behind successful 
innovation, one recommendation might be to explore the possibility for intervening on the 
demand side, which arguably should be within reach given that politicians actually control 
around half of GDP in many European countries (somewhat less in others but still a big chunk 
of overall demand). The challenge in that case would be how to transform the big spenders 
among the public sectors, such as education, health, communication, energy provision (in 
some countries) etc., into powerhouses for innovation. More generally, what would be needed 
is a transition to an experimental economy; in which experiments with new 
solutions/technologies would be the normal state of affairs, not the exception. Arguably, such 
an economy would generate more innovation, and higher R&D expenditure in the private 
sector. This would, however, also necessitate a tolerance among policy-makers and the 
general public for the failures that inevitably would accompany any transition to a more 
experimental policy framework. 
  Finally, what about the sustainability issue? Is the knowledge based dynamics (or 
innovation based growth) discussed here really sustainable in the long run? This is a 
challenging question and it is difficult (if not impossible) to answer it with any degree of 
“certainty”. However, what can be said is that if there is a sustainable growth path for the 
global economy, it is probably this one. Economic growth in the traditional sense requires 
increased use of non-renewable resources and is therefore likely at some stage to be 
constrained by resource scarcity. Innovation – and knowledge based growth – is about   22
mobilizing the knowledge, creativity and courage of the population to envisage new solutions 
that save resources and satisfy needs in new and better ways. Knowledge-based growth – 
what is sometimes termed “the innovation machine” - is a wonderful device to bring us closer 
to that aim. But firms and entrepreneurs need to be convinced that the new solutions they 
eventually come up with are likely to have a market, otherwise they will be reluctant to enter 
into the relevant search processes. Arguably, this is where politicians may have their main 
chance, e.g.; by providing motive, encouragement and direction to search processes that might 
otherwise have been prematurely abandoned (or never started). And a good place to start 
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